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R&D NETWORKS
The trend of recent years has been for IOCs to reduce their technological activities (evidenced by less R&D spending and less patenting) and for the major suppliers to increase theirs. There is strong evidence that these changes  have  happened  within  a  context  of  growing  use  of  innovation  networks.  Here,  we  look  more precisely at how the different actors have collaborated together.
Vertical integration is a response principally to high transaction costs (for example, in the specification and purchase  of  items  fr om  supply  companies)  and  information  asymmetry  (Oster,  1999).  Historically,  these costs and asymmetries arose in upstream petroleum because of the difficulty of co-ordinating the different functions  and  the  uncertainty  inherent  in  E&P  activities.  However,  with  technologies  of  co-ordination (computing  and  communications)  it  has  become  possible  for  distinct  functions  within  the  supply  chain  - previously  integrated  -  to  separate.  A  factor  tending  to  force  the  user  function  apart  fr om  the  supplier function  is  the  need  for  each  to  specialise,  in  order  to  manage  increasing  underlying  uncertainty  and challenge in the business and technology environments.
Collaborative  networks  are  examples  of  partial  vertical  integration:  they  are  ‘organised  markets`,  not governed by the open market. Many investments made by supply firms are transaction-specific and some information  asymmetries  remain,  hence  to  avoid  bargaining  problems  and  opportunistic  behaviour,  the relationship  between  user  and  supplier  must  be  regulated  somehow.  Transaction-specific  investments  are common in upstream petroleum because of the asset-specific nature of much of the technology.
In Frontier situations there is a case for  IOCs to keep the creation of technology internalised (effectively, integrating backwards into the supply function) owing to the lack of competitive supply and the prospect of competitive advantage fr om controlling Frontier technology.

4.1. Collaborative networks
Jaquier-Roux and Bourgeois (2002) contend that in the energy sector two styles of R&D have dominated: up
to  the  mid-1980s  a  vertically  integrated  organisation  (classical,  First  Generation,  in-house  R&D)  was  the norm.  Since  then  firm-networks  based  on  collaboration  of  one  form  or  another  have  proliferated.  The computing  and  telecom  revolutions  have  made  possible  the  necessary  co-ordination  between  functions outside of the close integration within a single firm. The enlarging group of companies involved in oilfield developments as a consequence of this “deconstruction of the oil industry’s integrated value chain” (Bresser et  al,  2000,  p  4)  demands  a  greater  degree  of  synchronisation  and  new  organisational  forms  become necessary. For the upstream petroleum sector, the oil price crash of 1985 provided the necessary crisis for operators to begin implementing new strategies and reforming their organisations. Reform has become now semi-continuous.
......... the collaborative model becomes  more  useful,  since  the  number  and  quality  (the  amount  and  type  of  information  exchanged)  of transactions increases.
Bourgeois (1999).........
°    Financial leverage achieved by IOCs by distributing costs among partners (high leverage implies high collaboration)
°    Number of external partners involved in a project (few partners would tend to imply low collaboration)
°    Type of external partners involved in a project (collaborative or protective, functioned on the behaviour adopted by partners)........

4.2. Joint Industry Projects
Joint  Industry  Projects  (JIPs)  date  fr om  the  early  1970s,  so  are  not  unique  to  the  collaborative  network model, which dates fr om the mid-1980s. Sharing of tasks on substantial technological projects is not a new feature  of  the  industry.  One  of  the  largest  upstream  petroleum  JIPs  now  is  DeepStar,  formed  in  1991  to pursue  technology  for  Gulf  of  Mexico  deepwater.  It  has  63  member  firms  (48  suppliers  and  15  oil companies) (GasTIPS, 2002). And JIPs are not popular only with private firms, but with governments also,
for example Norway’s State Research Council helps finance a Statoil / Shell / Halliburton / Petrotech(12)  JIP. Where the cost of developing a technology is high, the risk is large or the technology diverse or complex then it is normal to form a JIP, involving service companies and operators. These syndicate the investments
and pool a wider body of skills. For these reasons, JIPs are especially popular with smaller oil firms. Acha
(2002)  points  out  that  oil  firms’  “preference  to  syndicate”  (p.  97)  their  investments  in  oilfields  might influence  the  forming  of  collaborative  relationships  around  technology.  However,  such  syndication  is  not
common among the ISCs, who tend to develop technology separately of other suppliers whenever they have
the capability to do so.
Interview  confirmed  that  the  relatively  low  costs  to  an  oil  operator  of  joining  many  JIPs  and  the  limited commitment required mean that the larger operators can afford to participate in many projects. Each of the
oil companies interviewed explained that the costs of participating in a JIP are sufficiently low, such that
wherever they have an interest in the topic they will participate, “just to see what happens” being a common view. Consequently, a strategic approach and careful selection of JIPs is not  universal. Sanderson (2002),

(12) Statoil is Norway’s state-owned oil company, Petrotech is a supply company
however,  in  reviewing  BP’s  approach  to  membership  and  formation  of  certain  JIPs  outlines  a  more structured approach. Such an approach may also be true for operators with more lim ited R&D budgets.
It is recognised (Acha, 2002 and Jacquier-Roux and Bourgeois, 2002) that negotiations over IPR ownership
are often the most complex element in establishing any JIP. However, as Acha points out, who shares in the knowledge (a separate issue from ownership of it) is equally important but is rarely controlled to any extent.

4.3. Practical experience of collaborative models
Interviews with technology managers in oil operators and supply companies provided some insights into how collaboration  works  in  practice.  There  is  consensus  that  external  networks  for  technology  innovation  are advantageous and are being used increasingly, but also that some problems remain.
The  majority  of  interviewees  reported  on  going  and  unresolved  difficulties  in  working  with  different partners. Attempts at creating partnerships were often described as “experimental” and the results “mixed”.

4.3.1. Collaboration with suppliers has produced results, but expect adjustments
The ISCs would be expected to be organised better for innovation and more productive innovators for each R&D dollar  spent. The Schlumberger  manager  interviewed for  our  research agreed with this analysis and clearly  saw  Schlumberger’s  differentiation  and  competitive  advantage  based  upon  technology  and  having unique products to offer (Montaron, 2003). Producing and commercialising innovations is closer to both an ISC’s core competence (product development) and competitive position (maintained through defending its products) and ISC patenting activity has certainly been strong in the last 10 years. Qureshi (2003) also felt that  ISCs  could  be  shown  to  be  more  productive  patentees  per  R&D  $  than  oil  firms.  The  three  Shell managers interviewed (Luca et al, 2003), however, did not perceive any large efficiency gain when R&D is outsourced and the EIA’s website (Dooley, last updated 2003) notes that “No data to support or refute the ‘increases in Energy R&D efficiency hypothesis’ has been found”.
There is circumstantial evidence that the cycle time for innovation has shrunk, and Luca et al (2003) ascribed this to increased collaboration in networks, but also saw lim its to how far outsourcing can go. Operators may
in fact take some technology tasks back just as others continue to be outsourced, in a dynamic equilibrium, with differentiation being made between technologies.

4.3.2. Different partnership models
Several interviewees described that although collaboration was increasingly how innovation was managed, there were many false starts in the process and various models of co-working, with different roles for the partners (both IOC and ISC) in evidence. Whether these are durable, with deep partnerships being formed, is uncertain. Shell’s position (from interview with Luca et al, 2003) is usually to simply adopt the fastest or most  profitable  way  to  implement  any  technology,  but  bilateral  relationships  were  highlighted  as  a particularly durable partnership model.
Halliburton  Energy  Services  (HES),  part  of  the  Halliburton  Company,  points  out  that  oil  firms’  rate  of adoption of novel technology is a significant challenge for the whole industry (Halliburton Energy Services,
2003). While HES perceives that much of the burden of conceiving and commercialising oilfield technology rests with the large service companies, it seeks to have direct client involvement in its product development
as a means of attracting interest and having clients commit to field trials. Schlumberger, on the other hand,
while working with selected clients to field-test items, develops technology alone (Montaron, 2003). Thus, it should not be assumed that all suppliers are equally open to collaborating, even with key clients.

4.3.3. Price pressure
........
4.3.4. Acquiring knowledge for commercial gain
.........

4.3.5. Bargaining problems and the funding of R&D
The  transaction-specific  nature  of  investments  in  upstream  petroleum  creates  difficulties  between  the suppliers  that  invest  in  technology  development  and  the  oil  companies  that  may  ultimately  buy  the technology. Often, IOCs are unwilling to make the commitment to buy or give the financial assistance that
the supply firm seeks. This view was expressed by the supply firms interviewed and tacitly acknowledged by
the operators as an obstacle to co-operation. Suppliers have often invested heavily in innovation, only to be disappointed by clients wary of  non-proven technology, who place a low value on the innovation or  who
bargain over price (bargaining problems as part of opportunistic behaviour).

4.3.6. Collaboration works best wh ere there is high technology content in the product or service Collaboration is most concentrated in a few areas of the upstream petroleum industry, according to fieldwork
for this study. It is strong in the development of technologies related to reservoir appraisal but is found rarely
in development of, for example, production technologies or drilling and construction services. Interviews, for example, with managers in two suppliers with contract drilling businesses, ENSCO and Saipem, suggest that the low technology content of a drilling rig means there is no reason for operators to treat drilling contractors
at all collaboratively (Wilson, 2003 and Valenchon, 2003).
This reflects the pattern of what technology is core and non-core for oil operators and also the distinction between Frontier and established technologies. There must be a high content of technology in the product or service to persuade the oil company to adopt a collaborative, rather then market-based, relationship with the supplier. High technology content reflects rapid innovation and change, which is a response to a dynamic and uncertain business environment.
However,  even  wh ere there  is technology within  the products or  services, the competitive  position  of  the supplier  is  not  always  sustained  easily.  Saipem,  for  example,  invests  in  items  with  a  high  technology component (in LNG and deepwater facilities) but the Saipem manager interviewed perceived little and only temporary  differentiation,  hence  brief  competitive  advantage,  from  these  (Valenchon,  2003).  Innovation within service companies brings only brief competitive advantage (expressed as premium pricing or higher market share) since new designs become standardised quickly. Six companies compete for business in the integrated service and supply sector and competition is high.

4.4. Position of the IOCs: Systems integrators and Heads of technology networks We think of an oilfield development in technological terms as relying upon a large number of technology networks to create the necessary products and services. Thus, the IOC will be the Architect in charge of the development and will also be the Head of a number of technology networks.
°    IOC as Systems Integrator
As IOCs have reduced their involvement in technology creation, they have become integrators increasingly of  others’ technology to occupy a system integrator role (often called an Architect  role). In the literature, however, this term has differing definitions. Here, the term is used to describe an IOC that  works neither exclusively itself  on technology nor  simply buys technology from suppliers, but  that  actively collaborates within  external  networks  to  assemble  or  integrate  technologies  for  an  oilfield  development.  The  systems integrator remains engaged in actual technology creation and actively collaborates with others. The systems integrator  outsources  innovation  according  to  strategic  criteria  but  does  not  loose  influence  over  and capability  in  a  wide  range  of  oilfield  technologies.  ........motivated by profit to focus on cost efficiencies of  increasingly  standardised  approaches.  However,  there  has  been  an  increasing  number  of  such  oilfield technology networks  that  suppliers  have  become  the head  of  and  Bourgeois (1999)  suggests that  it  is  the suppliers who are now in control of and expert in many technologies. The buyers – the oil companies – have merely  become  adept   at  writing  tender   documents  and  subsequently  contracts  to  translate  business requirements into technological terms.
We argue here that both suppliers and the IOCs control technology networks and have capacity and initiative around  innovation.  IOCs  should  and  do  retain  control  over  particular  technology  networks  wh ere  that technology  is  critical  within  the  portfolio  of  assets  (in  Frontier  situations,  for  example).  Otherwise,  the technology  should  be  managed  from  the  supply  sector.  In  this  way,  each  technology  network  has  the appropriate player at its head.
4.5. Collaboration between Suppliers
............

(13) It is noted that this deregulation of energy markets was concerned mostly with the transmission and sale of gas and electricity
and had little impact on E&P activities directly  Generators’  capacity  to  absorb  novel  technology  is  seriously reduced  and  they are  exposed  to  the  risk  of changes in the environment that require a technological response, for example increase in the oil or gas price or a new entrant with some disruptive technology. By contrast, in upstream petroleum it is normally the case that the operator is at least closely involved in all operations, if not almost entirely involved.

4.7. The sustainability of collaborative networks
In the time that collaborative networks have flourished and operator profits have reached higher levels, the profitability of oil supply firms has declined. The financial health of oil firms is described as being at its best
in 20 years (Salomon Smith Barney, 2001), following their  most  recent  mega-mergers. ...... transactions are conducted that is under question, not the outsourcing of innovation itself.
....... services  business.  This  complicates  analysis  of  ISC business performance.